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Resumo
Este estudo desenvolve uma análise conceitual e teórica de comunicação de risco em
casos nos quais os especialistas e o público apresentam pontos de vista amplamente
divergentes sobre o tamanho de um risco. As aplicações são escolhidas dentre os pro-
blemas de gerenciamento de risco inerentes ao manuseio de combustível nuclear usa-
do. Enfatiza-se o fato de que pontos de vista conflitantes apresentam bases muito di-
ferentes. O papel da confiança é analisado e, sendo um tema crucial, é muito mais
abrangente do que geralmente se presume. As razões para esta diferença são encon-
tradas em modelos de percepção de risco aplicados a dados de pesquisa sobre percep-
ção de risco e atitudes a ela relacionadas.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: PERCEPÇÃO DE RISCO • ESCOLHA DE LOCAL • REJEITO NUCLEAR • COM-
BUSTÍVEL NUCLEAR USADO
Abstract
This paper develops a conceptual and theoretical analysis of risk communication in
cases where experts and the public have widely divergent views of the dimensions of
a risk. Applications are chosen from among the risk management problems that are
inherent to handling of spent nuclear fuel. One stresses the fact that the conflicting
points of views have very different bases. The role of trust is analyzed and, as it is a
crucial issue, it becomes much more encompassing than what has usually been
assumed. The reasons for this difference can be found in risk perception models
applied to survey data concerning risk perception and related attitudes.
KEYWORDS: RISK PERCEPTION • SITING • NUCLEAR WASTE • SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
Resumen
Se desarrolla un análisis conceptual y teórico de la comunicación de riesgo en casos
en que los expertos y el público presentan puntos de vista significativamente diver-
gentes sobre la dimensión de un riesgo. Se eligen las aplicaciones entre los problemas
de gestión de riesgo inherentes al manoseo del combustible nuclear usado y se enfa-
tiza el hecho de que los puntos de vista contrarios presentan bases muy diferentes. Se
analiza el papel de la confianza y, aunque se trate de un tema crucial, es mucho más
amplio de lo que generalmente se presume. Las razones para esta profunda diferen-
cia se encuentran en modelos de percepción de riesgo aplicados a datos de investiga-
ción sobre percepción de riesgo y actitudes relacionadas con esta última.
PALABRAS CLAVE: PERCEPCIÓN DE RIESGO • ELECCIÓN DE LUGAR • RECHAZO NUCLEAR •
COMBUSTIBLE NUCLEAR USADO
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Risk communication is a relatively new field of research. It was developed in the1980’s following work on risk perception, which had emerged as an interestingand important field of work in the end of the 1970’s. As early as 1989, a manual
was published (National Research Council, 1989), and reviews are available, e.g. by
Renn (1992) and Fischhoff (1995). An updated risk communication manual which deals
fairly with the issues involved is that by Lundgren and McMakin (1998).
Some of this work will be treated here. In addition, the present paper reviews some
of the risk perception and communication research carried out in the Center for Risk
Research of the Stockholm School of Economics, and some of our earlier work. The
tensions between parties in a conflict ridden risk management issue were treated in
an early paper (SJÖBERG, 1980) which largely stemmed from experience with nuclear
power debates in the 1970’s, and a later expansion of the frame of reference which
was given in later papers (SJÖBERG, 1991, 1998a).
When people communicate, they must achieve at least two purposes: their message
must conform to their beliefs and they must be credible. This is obvious because the
purpose of communication is the transfer of beliefs to another party, who may be either
ignorant about the topic or who may hold beliefs seen as erroneous. Both these
conditions are true in many risk communication situations. The type of situation
considered here is the one where experts assess the risk to be quite small while the
many members of the public have an opposite view and little knowledge beyond that2.
The setting provided by a concrete example will first be described. Other examples
might have brought at least partly different aspects into focus.
The example to be discussed is that of nuclear waste and the siting of a high-level
nuclear waste (HLNW) repository. This is a very difficult social and political problem
in all countries that have nuclear power. The data cited here come from Sweden, which
has a nuclear power program, but of course, similar conceptual analyses can be made
in other countries in Western Europe, the USA, Japan and several other countries. A
recent European project investigated these matters in depth in France (BARTHE &
MAYS, 1998; MAYS & EGOUY, 1998), Spain (CEBRIÁN, PRADES & SOLÁ, 1998;
2 The other major risk communication challenge emerges in situation where the opposite is true:
experts perceive a serious risk and many members of the public ignore it. This is the case with
some lifestyle risks such as unhealthy diets (SJÖBERG, 2003c), and also with an environmental
risk such as indoor Radon gas in homes.
MENARD, PRADES & SOLÁ, 1998), and Sweden (SJÖBERG, VIKLUND &
TRUEDSSON, 1998; 1999). In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU), it
is possible that a somewhat different discourse will be necessary since trust is much
lower in these countries, for historical reasons, but they are beyond the scope of the
present paper. There are of course differences also among countries in Western
Europe, due to technical, social, and political conditions. Yet, the psychology of risk
communication seems remarkably similar.
Why has this particular risk communication problem become so special and difficult
to handle? Radioactive waste is, in fact, seen by many members of the public both as a
major part of nuclear risks and as a major part of all waste risks (SJÖBERG, 2006b).
Expert opinion certainly does not agree with these views. They may have many roots,
one being the pending situation with regard to the future of nuclear power in many
countries. If nuclear waste cannot be safely sited in permanent storage, the prospects
of expanding or even retaining at a constant level, of present nuclear power programs
are dim. Hence, nuclear power opponents may see opposition to siting as one way of
creating an obstacle to the nuclear program at large. Yet, this cannot be the only source
of conflict. Some people are just very strongly opposed to having a local repository in
their neighborhoods, as illustrated by the Kynnefjäll vigil, in the Southwestern county
of Bohuslän in Sweden (NORESSON, 1985). For almost 20 years, a group of people
held a 24-hour watch on an area, which had been named as a possible candidate for a
site investigation for a future repository. They withdrew only in 2000, when several other
areas were more likely candidates. This may be seen as a dramatic and extreme case of
Nimby-ism3, yet this is probably a misleading analysis. Nimby attitudes are not a major
part of opposition to local repositories, at least not in Sweden (SJÖBERG & DROTTZ-
SJÖBERG, 2001). The overwhelming majority of opponents object both to nuclear
technology as such, and to local siting of radioactive wastes. They do not say “nuclear
power is fine and useful to me, but I will not have its wastes sited in my community”,
but rather “I want to have nothing to do with nuclear power or with its wastes”.
Nimby is an example of derogatory expressions that unfortunately exist and tend to
exacerbate conflicts and provide no real insights into how people think about these
matters. Another example is “radiophobia” which is now fortunately less often used,
and should not be used at all (DROTTZ-SJÖBERG & PERSSON, 1993). Although
there are probably some clinical cases where such a term may be appropriate, it is very
misleading as an attempt at understanding the thinking of most people who oppose
nuclear power or the siting of a local repository.
In order to understand and successfully carry out risk communication with regard
to any topic, it is necessary to have a realistic picture of how the parties in the
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3 Not-In-My-Backyard or Nimby is a common term for describing opposition to unwanted local 
facilities.
communication episode view the issues at hand. A major problem therefore centers
on modeling the public’s risk perception. Received models have been found to be
inadequate, both with regard to the public (SJÖBERG, 2002b) and to experts (SJÖBERG,
2002a). The Psychometric Model (FISCHHOFF, SLOVIC, LICHTENSTEIN, READ
& COMBS, 1978) which apparently seems to be credible to many, and is the basis of
the “outrage” approach to risk communication (SANDMAN, 1989; 1993), accounts
for only a minor portion of risk perception data and clearly needs to be improved. In
the present paper, alternative approaches will be briefly reviewed.
However, any conflict about a societal risk issue requires an analysis also at levels
beyond the individual. It requires such analyses to be concrete and take into account the
historical, social and political context in which the conflict emerged. The psychological
analysis of individual minds is clearly necessary, but the step to the societal level
requires new elements of analysis. Micro-psychology cannot become macro-psychology
simply by aggregation or “telescoping”, by generalizing from one level to the other
with no regard to the institutional context and the structural restraint on the events.
The theory of social amplification of risk (KASPERSON, 1992; KASPERSON et al.,
1988; RENN, BURNS, KASPERSON, KASPERSON & SLOVIC, 1992) attempts to
solve this problem, but a detailed account and discussion of it is beyond the scope of
the present paper. It may suffice to say that the theory gives no specific predictions
of the outcome of any risk relevant episode. Maybe it would be better to avoid the
term theory and to regard it as a pre-theoretical conceptual structure.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a conceptual and theoretical analysis of risk
communication in situations where various groups entertain differing views about a
risk on quite different bases. I begin with a brief sketch of the situation with regard
to the siting of a HLNW repository in Sweden. Then follows a surface view where
the concrete issues and the participants in the conflictual communication situation
are described. A concluding section takes the discussion a step below the surface and
analyzes the situation in terms of political, or rhetorical, communication rather than
information transfer or “education”.
Current situation with regard to the siting of a HLNW repository in Sweden
The agent responsible for finding a site is a corporation called Svensk Kärnbrän-
slehantering AB4, or SKB for short. It is owned by the nuclear industry in Sweden, and
the Government. The process of siting has been going on for about two decades and
encountered many difficulties. Most dramatically, two local referenda in 1995 and 1997
rejected further investigation of feasibility for siting in the respective communities –
Storuman and Malå in the North of Sweden. However, the process was halted at an
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4 In English: Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co.
earlier stage in several other communities. See Sjöberg et al. (SJÖBERG et al., 1998;
1999) for reviews.
A very brief analysis of the political process can be done as follows. Sweden has
several political parties and a proportional system of representation. The two largest
parties in Sweden and in most local Councils are the Social Democrats and the
Conservatives (called the Moderate party). They are in majority if they join ranks, but
they rarely do, of course. However, in the case of siting these two parties have several
times united in suggesting a process to be started in their community, only to find that
many supporters of the Social Democrats then threatened to switch to supporting
either the Left party (formerly the communists), the Environmentalist party or
possibly the Center party.
In this situation, the Social Democrats often found it difficult to remain in support of
the siting proposal. A somewhat paradoxical switch from Left to Right in local Council
majorities could be caused by anti-nuclear opinion changing sides from the Social
Democrats to the Center party, since the latter party usually sides with the non-
socialist block in most other issues. This phenomenon was the cause of the unique
change of Government in Sweden in 1976 when the Social Democrats were voted out
of office for the first time since 1932. The possibility still exists even if it is smaller
today since much or most of the strong anti-nuclear opposition is absorbed by the Left
party (now enjoying more democratic credibility since the fall of communism in
Eastern Europe and the FSU) and the Environmentalists (which did not exist as a
political party in 1976).
The goal of the process currently underway is to find a voluntary host5. Attempts to
find a voluntary community have been going on for a long time, and since 1993, there
have been several feasibility studies of communities, which invited SKB to carry out
such studies. Three of the municipalities which have had feasibility studies carried
out by SKB have been judged to be of interest as possible hosts. The second phase
involves actual drilling to assess the quality of bedrock, an undertaking called a site
investigation. This is a major undertaking that will take several years to complete. Two
site investigations were started in Sweden in 2002, in Östhammar and Oskarshamn,
after the local Councils had given their consent. The public opinion has since become
more positive to a repository during the course of the site investigations (SJÖBERG,
2006a). On the other hand, there is no sign that opinion in the rest of the country is
becoming more positive to a local repository, in spite of a trend towards a clearly
more positive attitude towards nuclear power itself (HOLMBERG, 2003).
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5 It should be noted that, as a last resort, the Government can decide about siting in spite of local
Council opposition or a No in a local referendum about the issue, but all parties concerned want
to avoid such a development.
Factors behind the development towards consent for a site investigation in two Swedish
municipalities were discussed elsewhere (SJÖBERG, 2003d, 2004b). These are small
communities, which already are hosts of nuclear facilities, including low-level nuclear
waste management. Regional authorities are not elected by people in the region but
appointed by the government, and they have assumed a low profile in the process.
Comparing to the situation in the USA, there is no State government, which faces
public opposition at a somewhat larger distance from the sites under investigation.
In 2001, a survey study was carried out in the three communities (SJÖBERG, 2006b)6.
It involved many questions about risk perception, about utilities and about policy
attitudes. The background is quite interesting. Previous surveys at the national
level (only few local surveys had been conducted) had tended to conclude either that
a sizable majority of Swedes were ready to accept a local repository, or that they
were very strongly against it7. The former conclusion was based on a question, which
made implicit assumptions and asked about “acceptance”. The latter conclusion was
based on a question whether the respondent was “positive” to a local repository.
In the study mentioned it was preferred to ask about policy related intentions, such
as how the respondent would vote if there were to be a local referendum on the matter.
A similar approach had been taken in an earlier study where experts and the public
were compared, with the public represented by a national sample (SJÖBERG &
DROTTZ-SJÖBERG, in press). It was found that a clear majority in two of the
municipalities (Östhammar and Oskarshamn) stated that they would vote in favor of
a repository and many said they would do so also in the third community (Tierp). A
local referendum was regarded as desirable by most of the respondents. The judgment
that a democratic decision is called for seems obvious (SJÖBERG, 2001b).
It is important to inquire into the reasons for this accepting attitude. Some of the reasons
could be studied in the survey data, and some could not. The latter included dimensions
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6 The survey also involved a fourth, neighboring, community (Älvkarleby) which would be involved
in transportation of spent nuclear fuel.
7 The message that the Swedish public had accepted a repository in their own community was spread
internationally some years ago, see e.g. Flynn et al. (FLYNN et al., 1995). However, this conclusion
was based on a leading and ambiguous survey question. When local referenda were held in two
Northern communities in 1995 (Storuman) and 1997 (Malå), people there rejected site investigations
and hence the possibility of future siting.
that were probably not within the scope of policy and risk communication activities,
such as personality (SJÖBERG, 2003b), and traditional religiosity or “New Age” types
of beliefs (SJÖBERG & af WÅHLBERG, 2002). However, several factors were
investigated and they accounted for a very large share (about 65%) of the variance of
policy attitude (SJÖBERG, 2004a). They were:
• Attitude to nuclear power;
• Risks and benefits of a local repository;
• Trust in authorities and experts;
• Trust in science;
• General tendency towards rating risks as large or small.
It is important to consider, in particular, the role of attitude8 to nuclear power. Both
Oskarshamn and Östhammar are already hosts of nuclear industry. Both of them
have nuclear power plants. In addition, Oskarshamn hosts the Swedish national
temporary storage facility for spent nuclear fuel (CLAB). Östhammar hosts the
corresponding facility for final storage of low and medium level radioactive waste
(SFR). The nuclear industry is a large employer in both of these small communities.
Furthermore, there is a history of quite competent management of the facilities and
no incidents of serious leakage, or attempts to hide such leakage from the public and
media. People trust the industry both because many work there and because of its
history of competent management of risk. An accepting attitude is often found in
populations close to a nuclear facility, see e.g. Williams et al. (WILLIAMS, BROWN
& GREENBERG, 1999).
Yet, they may not have been “positive” to the idea of a repository in their community.
Such a facility would bring few benefits by itself (only relatively few jobs). Yet, people
in Sweden as a whole, and certainly in these communities, perceive a responsibility
that we must manage radioactive waste in a safe manner and that our generation, which
has benefited from nuclear power, is the one, which must do it. In addition, almost
nobody argues that the waste should be sent somewhere else.
The current situation with regard to siting in Sweden can thus be said to be positive.
There are communities which may accept a repository, and which have been found
to be likely to be adequate also from technical, geological, and other points of view.
But of course, there is still a long way to go before a final decision, which can only be
made following a successful site investigation.
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8 It is sometimes argued that perceived risk and attitude are semantically overlapping, or even
synonyms, and hence that the role of attitude is an artefact. It is easy to see, however, that they
are conceptually quite distinct and that the relationship, or its direction, is by no means trivial. The
notion of an affect heuristic in risk perception (FINUCANE, ALHAKAMI, SLOVIC & JOHNSON, 2000)
is based on the same relationship, although attitude (liking) is called affect which tends to blur
necessary distinctions (SJÖBERG, 2006d).
A surface view
The parties
The people involved in the communication flow are (1) experts, (2) opponents among
the public, and (3) proponents among the public9. The experts are of course few and
one point of view is dominating among them: the risks are negligible when spent
nuclear fuel is handled in a competent manner and according to the technical solution,
they have developed. However, experts do not usually agree to 100%. There are
experts who are independent researchers and who, at times, challenge some of the
statements made by mainstream experts. For example, there are some geologists who
question the possibility to predict the developments in bedrock over long time periods
of thousands of years (SHRADER-FRECHETTE, 1993). Even some risk analysts
question the epistemological basis for such knowledge claims (OTWAY & von
WINTERFELDT, 1992).
The role of expert may seem relatively straightforward and it seems to be just
common sense to assume experts’ risk perception to be governed by objective facts,
not emotions or other subjective factors that were found early in the short history of
risk research to be of great importance for lay risk perception (FISCHHOFF, SLOVIC
& LICHTENSTEIN, 1982; SLOVIC, FISCHHOFF & LICHTENSTEIN, 1979). Indeed,
this claim was made by Slovic and coworkers and achieved the status of an urban
legend. It was simply believed and the empirical basis for it was not scrutinized.
However, when the basis is scrutinized it turns out that it has very important
limitations (ROWE & WRIGHT, 2001; SJÖBERG, 2002a). First, only a very small group
of risk assessment experts was studied. Second, they were not topical experts in the
various fields that were investigated. The fields were quite various and clearly, nobody
could be a substantial expert in more than one or two of them. Third, later work has
shown that, to the contrary of the traditional claim, experts tend to express risk
perceptions of a similar structure as that of lay people, although at a lower level of
perceived risk, provided that they make judgments of hazards where they have
professional responsibility (SJÖBERG, 1991). It should be added that the statements
refer to experts in cases where there is a very small risk, as determined by scientific
and technical analysis, while many members of the public hold the risk to be
considerable.
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9 There are also many others who are concerned and who are likely to take part in the process, e.g.
by voting in a local referendum, but they are seldom active in the risk communication process. It
should be noted that these more passive people for this reason alone are quite important for the
final decision. In Malå and Storuman, where local referenda were held, voter turnout was very high.
See Sjöberg (2003a) for a discussion of “stakeholders” and how they differ from the public at
large. An interesting example was given by Löfstedt (2001). Earlier work has shown how involved
people differ from others (MILBRATH, 1981).
The members of the public who are proponents of various technical projects and
who rate the risks as very small, or even non-existent, tend to be a group, which is
considerably larger than the opponents – about five times larger in our data. In spite
of that, they have been little studied. Their risk assessment coincides with that of the
experts, but it is not based on independent assessment of the risk, but on trust. There
are many interesting research questions left for future work when it comes to this group
(SJÖBERG, 2006c).
The group of opponents of course consists of people with little or no technical
expertise, at any rate insufficient expertise to form an independent opinion of the
issues at hand. They therefore have to trust, or not to trust, what the experts say. Trust
may refer to experts or their employers, or it may be in science itself. The former
alternative, which may be called social trust, has been discussed by many authors
(SLOVIC, 1993; SLOVIC, FLYNN & LAYMAN, 1991), and the dimensions usually
mentioned as trust creating attributes are competence, honesty and caring. Research
has shown that trust in experts may be fairly well explained by such attributes (PETERS,
COVELLO & MCCALLUM, 1997). Yet, social trust is insufficient to account for
concern, or perceived risk. In most studies, trust has been found to explain only about
10-15% of the variance of perceived risk (SJÖBERG, 1999). A substantial improvement
in explanatory value of risk perception models was obtained when trust in science
itself was added. In turn, such trust takes several forms. In one type of assessment,
questions are asked about whether there are limits to scientific knowledge. In another
type, questions are asked about belief in non-materialistic dimensions of the world,
and about the kind of knowledge one may have about them, and how it can be
achieved. These latter beliefs are often discussed under the heading “New Age” and
they are embraced by a truly astonishing number of people in all countries where they
have been investigated, not least in the FSU and other Eastern nations10. But similar
beliefs are also very common in countries with a different historical experience, both
Protestant and Catholic (SJÖBERG & af WÅHLBERG, 2002).
Skepticism with regard to science reveals a tendency of even broader importance. It
questions the very definition of expert. In the received meaning of the term, an expert
is somebody with an advanced education on a tropic and with extensive experience
from working on it. Formal acknowledgments are also an integral part of expertise,
such as a university degree, membership in a professional organization and a license to
practice. Yet, expertise may be challenged in a profound manner by people involved
in a risk communication episode. Jasanoff even stated that expertise can be quickly
attained by anyone (JASANOFF, 1998). Although this is an extreme viewpoint it may
well represent the opinions of many members of the public who do claim a right to
debate the technical issues of a risk management problem – not only by referring to
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10 It seems as if materialistic Marxism only managed to suppress spiritualistic beliefs and never
eradicated them. As soon at the apparatus of suppression disappeared, the beliefs surfaced.
dissenting experts but also by forming their own independent views of a matter. In
part, such claims may reflect local knowledge, based for example on observations in
nature, which may reveal facts about radioactive fallout not anticipated by experts and
truly relevant. In many cases, however, what is believed to be local or individual facts
may be quite misleading and causal attributions made on their basis may be quite
inadequate. Rumors can play an important role here (KAPFERER, 1989). Individual
cases of illness may have many causes, to take an example, and attributing them to a
given source of pollution may be unjustified, still quite convincing to many. Something
like this appears to have happened in Ukraine where apparently many illnesses were
attributed, without convincing scientific evidence, to Chernobyl fallout (DROTTZ-
SJÖBERG et al., 1994). In such cases, there is a dramaturgical logic, which supersedes
scientific logic: if there is a culprit, especially connected to earlier attempts to hide
the facts and shun responsibility, it gets to be a very persuasive case to argue that
various illnesses and/or accidents are caused by the culprit. The causal chain gets to
be personalized and there is someone to blame11.
The objects
The objects of communication are simple at a first glance, complex upon reflection.
The siting of a repository can mean many things, and the risks involved are multi-
dimensional. Some of the distinctions may be shared by the different parties; others
may be subject to misunderstandings.
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11 An interesting Swedish case is that of indoor Radon gas. When this environmental danger, which
is considerable in many countries such as Sweden and France, was first discussed in Sweden in
the 1970’s it was associated with the use of a certain type of concrete as building material. While
this was true, it was only a minor part of the whole problem of Radon. Most of the indoor Radon
comes from natural sources and enters houses in various ways. Once this was realized, there was
no longer a culprit, and the risk was even tied to Nature which is predominantly, in Sweden, seen
to be very beneficial and friendly. Public involvement disappeared. For a survey of risk perception
and communication with regard to Radon, see work by Sjöberg and Fisher (FISHER & SJÖBERG,
1990; SJÖBERG, 1989).
A few examples to illustrate the situation may be useful. In the two local referenda in
Sweden about siting, the question asked to the electorate was if a site investigation
was to be carried out. This is of course a very different question from the one about
final siting. Yet, it was hard to make the distinction in the debate (DROTTZ-SJÖBERG,
1998). A positive decision on a site investigation was probably seen by many as a proxy
for a final siting decision. Another example: all decisions regarding siting are taken with
regard to the spent nuclear fuel produced by the present nuclear program. There are
currently no convincing solutions of the problem of how nuclear power can be
replaced in its entirety. At the present, nuclear power produces about 50% of the
electricity used in Sweden. Both industries and households are dependent on a reliable
and reasonably cheap supply of electricity. Hence, it is very likely that the present
nuclear program at one point in the future must be expanded and continue beyond
the year 2010, and the volume of spent fuel to be handled by a repository will be
increased. Alternatively, several repositories must be constructed. Yet, these matters
cannot be discussed in a realistic manner as long as the long-term energy policy of
the country remains unsettled, or is lacking in credibility.
The constructions
In a study of nuclear waste risk perception, experts and the public made judgments
of risks as they saw them, and also judgments of how they believed that the other party
saw the risks (SJÖBERG, TRUEDSSON, FREWER & PRADES, 2000). It was found
that experts believed that the public saw the risks as larger than they in fact did. On
the other hand, the public believed that the experts saw the risks as small, but not
quite as small as they in fact did. Hence, both groups erred in the same direction: they
thought the other group saw larger risks than they in fact did.
This finding might be related to the very common fining that there is a difference
between perceived risk to oneself (personal risk) and to others (general risk). The
latter is usually – in fact, almost always – larger than the former. However, in the
case of a risk such as the one of nuclear waste, there is no reason to expect that the
difference is very large. It is only when the risks are seen as under one’s own control
that the difference becomes quite large, such as risks of smoking and drinking
alcohol, and also a technology risk such as IT risks (SJÖBERG & FROMM, 2001). Nuclear
technology is definitely not believed to be under the control by members of the public.
Hence, a small difference between personal and general risk is to be expected and other
factors must account for the systematic error in the judgments by the other party.
There are other possible reasons for the finding. The experts get their input from the
public through people who are especially concerned and they are likely to hold
more extreme views than others (SJÖBERG, 2003a). The public, on the other hand,
usually gets its information from experts who are especially assigned to the role of
communication with the public (unless they act as independent researchers). It is
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likely that they moderate their message somewhat to fit better in what they believe
are the conceptions that the public holds. Confronting an opposed part with a widely
divergent view may be seen as counterproductive, and other strategies are thus
employed.
Rhetorical communication
The most obvious approach to understanding the siting debate is to construe it as a
question of education or information transfer. After all, the experts agree largely
that we are dealing with a very small risk, which can be well managed by means of
technical solutions painstakingly developed and at the present well designed12. In
addition, there is an ethical responsibility involved. People certainly have the right to
information and it should be provided. Yet, it may be less efficient than often believed
to remain at this level. Other approaches are those of Public Relations or rhetoric.
Can risk communication be construed as advertising and Public Relations? The risk
is great that such an approach will contribute to further confusion, since advertising is
based on presumptions, which simply do not hold in the typical risk communication
case. Most consumer products are low in involvement and quite possibly fairly
similar from one brand to another. The consumer is assumed to pay little attention
to any message and may well be influenced by various more or less irrelevant cues.
However, in risk communication there is a high level of involvement for many actors
who see the issue as one involving their own health and that of their families and friends.
The “product” that is being “sold” is no simple thing at all.
In risk communication, there is not a question of buying at all, but rather of accepting
something, which may be regarded as largely negative. Extensive data have shown that
the risk aspects – health and reputation of the area in question – dominate the views
that people have of the proposed project. Utility, such as new jobs created, may enter,
but with a distinctly lower weight. The related notion that trust building is sufficient
was criticized by Trettin & Musham (2000). Their study is of special interest here
because it involved nuclear waste storage problems.
It is clear that many risk communication episodes involve political or rhetorical
communication (CORBETT & CONNORS, 1998). A situation of rhetorical
communication contains many dangers and pitfalls. Information exchange is only a
part, possibly a minor part, in such a situation. Instead, it is a question of persuasion,
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12 This statement refers only to the Swedish situation. In other countries, different conditions, e.g. of
geology, may call for a more cautious formulation and experts may take quite different points of view
regarding the risks involved in a proposed siting solution. In addition, the very long time perspectives
make it quite difficult to predict the safety of a repository (SHRADER-FRECHETTE, 1993).
and reference is made to external parties who may be the intended and important
recipients of the message, not the party to whom it is formally directed. In a case of
conflict between two parties, special problems of communication occur. People may
differ with regard to beliefs and also values, or goals. The parties may entertain
perspectives which involve tactical considerations – what seems like communication
is really an attempt to persuade others not directly taking part in communication. There
may be hidden agendas. Such hidden agendas may not be conscious but still affect the
arguments put forward. In typical rhetorical communication, the arguments are
shifting and elastic, and changed and made up as the discussion proceeds. When one
argument is met with a seemingly effective counterargument, other arguments are
produced in favor of the threatened position. Because of this common way of
functioning, risk communication is not well served by construing it as merely a
question of information, or even education. Whatever is necessary to reach social
consensus, it is not merely information.
In the present application, there is conflict over both goals and beliefs. Since rhetorical
communication tends to be, at the surface, about beliefs rather than values some
strange phenomena may occur – difficult to understand if the communication
situation is not construed as political (SJÖBERG & MONTGOMERY, 1999).
Consider, first, why communication is not about values. There are several reasons.
Values are shared in a culture, and the person who rejects important and shared values
takes a great risk. But values are also typically quite vague. They are such things as
freedom, equality, quality of life etc. Nobody can come out against them, and even
comparing them is difficult and risky. Is freedom more important than equality?
Who can tell? And not many people will even agree that there may be a conflict and
a necessity to choose. Value conflicts are avoided and serious discussions of them are
seldom or never carried out. Instead, the actors dodge such issues and construe the
situations in such a manner that no conflicts remain. This is done by twisting the
reality side of the argument – the beliefs. Hence, we end up in situations where
there are endless and seeming irresolvable disagreements about reality, especially if
future realities are at stake.
Just how intractable is the situation? There have been a few historical episodes, which
suggest that we are dealing with highly emotional processes and strong prejudice. An
often mentioned example is the Goiânia radiation panic (PETTERSON, 1988) in 1987.
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Following a serious, but quite limited, radiation accident in this region of Brazil,
there was widespread behavior which was interpreted by Slovic et al. as an example
of “stigma” (SLOVIC, LAYMAN et al., 1991). The stigma “model” suggests that there
is a very difficult problem for risk communication, and it is important to scrutinize it.
Repository opposition was related to the notion of stigma by Slovic et al. (SLOVIC,
FLYNN & GREGORY, 1994; SLOVIC, LAYMAN et al., 1991). The word refers, of
course, to the ancient Greek custom of putting a mark on a criminal so that all could
see that he had been found guilty of a serious crime. Goffman made the concept
salient in modern social science (GOFFMAN, 1963). A person is stigmatized if it
becomes known that he or she has committed certain acts, which are considered
shameful and strongly unacceptable. The stigmatized person encounters a hostile
social environment and finds it hard to be rehabilitated or accepted again. Strong
prejudice is developed as well as strong emotional rejection of the person.
Surely, this process does occur in certain cases. But is it an appropriate description of
opposition to a HLNW repository? Not all opposition can be characterized as a case
of stigma, to be sure. There must be an accompanying strong emotional reaction and
strong prejudice, otherwise stigma is just a (misleading) synonym for opposition.
However, the literature on stigma has little to say about such emotional and prejudicial
reactions (BROSTRÖM, KESSLING, KRAFFT & SJÖBERG, 2002). Risk perception is
usually not a strongly emotional matter (SJÖBERG, 1998b). It is a matter of intellectual
judgment, however much one may question the quality of the inferences that are
made.
The use of the stigma concept in the risk communication literature is but an example
of the exploitation of common sense notions. Since social and psychological realities
rarely are well described by common sense, the use of such notions presupposes
that they are not developed or questioned. The further specifics are just ignored.
Other examples could be given as well, such as the views on experts discussed in the
introduction.
Conclusion
In order for risk communication to succeed, it must have a realistic working model of
the parties who take part in a communication episode. It is necessary to go well beyond
explications of common sense, because in social and behavioral science common
sense is rarely a good first approximation to truth. Much current work fails in this
respect. The received view of risk perception of the public depicts them as quite
emotional (LOEWENSTEIN, WEBER, HSEE & WELCH, 2001), while the experts
are seen as rational and objective. The empirical research behind these notions is not
sufficient to support them, and the view that now emerges of public, and to some
RISK COMMUNICATION BETWEEN EXPERTS AND THE PUBLIC: PERCEPTIONS AND INTENTIONS •  LENNART SJÖBERG
81ANO 4 • NÚMERO 6 • 1º SEMESTRE DE 2007 • organicom •
extent expert, risk perception is that it is a question of ideology, not emotion. The
ideology concepts we have found to be of importance regard “tampering with Nature”
(SJÖBERG, 2000) and special ontological and epistemological beliefs (SJÖBERG & af
WÅHLBERG, 2002), connected to beliefs about the limitations of current scientific
knowledge (SJÖBERG, 2001a). The theory of risk communication must be developed
on a basis of differences in basic beliefs about Nature and about Science. The surface
analysis, which stops at noting that the public is either ignorant about technical and
scientific facts or simply emotional and feeling intense fear, is bound to fail.
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